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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its decision in Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp.,1 which joined a group of Supreme Court2 and lower federal court3 cases which have, one by one,
twisted and turned the Supreme Court’s holding in Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois4 into an incomprehensible mess. The Eighth Circuit in
Campos continued to muddy the waters of antitrust standing by reformulating5 Illinois Brick’s “indirect purchaser doctrine”6 to effectively create an insurmountable barrier to those plaintiffs injured by
Ticketmaster’s antitrust violations who wish to find their redress
through compensation under section 4 of the Clayton Act.7 These
cases have helped not only to deny certain injured plaintiffs standing
to sue but also to confuse the lower courts about how to apply this
indirect purchaser analysis. It is also difficult for potential defendants to determine whether their actions violate Illinois Brick.
Part II of this Comment provides an in-depth overview of the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Campos and the underlying factual background that accompanies that decision. Part III discusses the legal
basis for the indirect purchaser doctrine in Illinois Brick and its
“mirror image”8 predecessor, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.9 In Part IV, this Comment demonstrates the confusion
surrounding the Illinois Brick decision by analyzing how, in subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court has grappled with its own indirect purchaser analysis and how the lower courts’ incredible attempts to synthesize these mixed signals from the High Court have
created a great amount of inconsistency. Lastly, this Comment posits
1. 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999).
2. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); Assoc. Gen. Contractors of
Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Blue Shield of Va. v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
3. See Lucas Auto. Eng’g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir.
1998); Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874 (10th Cir.
1997); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997);
McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron
Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993).
4. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
5. See Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169-70 (holding that indirect purchasers who bear some
of the portion of the monopoly overcharge “only by virtue of an antecedent transaction between the monopolist and another, independent purchaser . . . may not sue to recover
damages for the portion of the overcharge they bear”).
6. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 729 (holding that only the overcharged direct purchaser, not any other purchaser farther down the manufacture or distribution chain, may
have standing to pursue an action seeking treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule Under Illinois
Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 603 (1979).
9. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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in Part V that we can better view Campos and other cases of this nature through a different lens—a more pragmatic approach to the
common law antitrust standing doctrine announced by the Supreme
Court in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters (AGC).10
II. LOOKING AT CAMPOS V. TICKETMASTER CORP.
The path to the Eighth Circuit began in December 1994, when sixteen suits against Ticketmaster Corporation, the largest entertainment ticket distributor in the United States,11 were consolidated in
the Eastern District of Missouri for pretrial proceedings.12 Each suit
involved plaintiffs—individuals and groups of individuals who had
purchased tickets through Ticketmaster—naming various members
of Ticketmaster’s management structure and the corporation itself as
defendants.13 In September 1995, after dismissal of eleven of these
cases, the remaining five plaintiffs filed a new consolidated complaint solely against Ticketmaster Corporation.14
In their consolidated complaint, these plaintiffs alleged five counts
of antitrust violation. Two counts alleged that Ticketmaster violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act15 by entering into exclusive agreements
with various concert venues and promoters to fix ticket prices16 and
“conspiring with [such] venues and promoters to boycott performers
who refused to allow the venue to use Ticketmaster’s distribution
services.”17 Because performers such as Pearl Jam18 refused to contract to play at venues conspiring with Ticketmaster, the plaintiffs
were allegedly injured by being prohibited from enjoying these boycotted performers.19 Two counts alleged violations of section 2 of the
Sherman Act20 for Ticketmaster’s elimination or attempt to eliminate
competition in the market for ticket distribution services.21 Lastly,
10. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
11. Brett Atwood, Web Ticket Sales to Pass $2 Bil. by 2001, BILLBOARD, May 31, 1997,
at 81 (stating that Ticketmaster “maintains its stranglehold on the [ticket] distribution
system”).
12. In re Ticketmaster Corp. Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (E.D. Mo.
1996), rev’d sub nom. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
16. In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp. at 1276.
17. Jill S. Kingsbury, Note, The Indirect Purchaser Doctrine: Antecedent Transaction?,
65 MO. L. REV. 473, 474 (2000).
18. See Lessley Anderson, Tickets! Please, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Oct. 4, 1999 (explaining that Pearl Jam was forced to play smaller clubs, and make less revenue, in order to
make financial-friendly ticket distribution services available to their fans and avoid the excessive service charges levied by Ticketmaster).
19. In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp at 1276.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
21. In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp at 1276; Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 474.
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one count alleged that Ticketmaster violated section 7 of the Clayton
Act22 through its illegal acquisition of its competitors, which has effectively inhibited entry into the ticket distribution industry.23
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from Ticketmaster’s alleged
violations under section 16 of the Clayton Act24 and treble damages
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.25 The plaintiffs premised these
damages on alleged overcharges in the form of excessive service fees
arising from Ticketmaster’s exercise of monopoly power in the ticket
distribution market.26
The lower tribunal dismissed the action, holding that the plaintiffs were indirect purchasers of Ticketmaster tickets pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Illinois Brick and, therefore, lacked
standing to sue.27 Additionally, “[t]he district court also held that,
even if the plaintiffs were not [classified as] indirect purchasers, they
were nevertheless inappropriate plaintiffs under the standards set
forth” in the Supreme Court’s decision in AGC.28 Lastly, the trial
court found that three of the consolidated cases lacked proper
venue.29 This last holding is not relevant to the inquiry in this Comment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit, contending that
the lower court erred in all of its holdings.30
A. Factual Background
According to the complaint, “Ticketmaster is a monopoly supplier
of ticket distribution”31 and delivery services for a multitude of entertainment events, and it has long-term exclusive contracts with most
large-scale venues and “with almost every promoter of concerts in the
United States.”32 Because of the pervasiveness of Ticketmaster’s contracting practices with concert promoters, Ticketmaster is guaranteed to hold the ticket distribution rights to most large-scale popular
music events, regardless of whether they have an exclusive contract

22. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
23. In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp at 1276; Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 474.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 26.
25. Id. § 15.
26. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1998).
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 476 (noting the district court’s conclusion
that plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing because plaintiffs “had not suffered an injury of
the type that Congress sought to redress with the antitrust laws” and that “problems with
calculating damages, duplicative recovery, and identifying proper members of plaintiffs’
proposed class” precluded standing under AGC).
29. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1168.
30. Id.
31. Id. Because the consolidated case was dismissed by the district court on the pleadings, the Eighth Circuit treated “all factual allegations of the complaint as true.” Id. (citing Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 1997)).
32. Id. at 1169.
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with the venue.33 This right gives Ticketmaster the ability “to distribute tickets over the telephone, at outlets such as [those at] retail
[and department] stores, and at the venue” where the event will take
place, as well as extracting from plaintiffs and other purchasers of
tickets “supracompetitive fees” in the form of convenience and service
charges, which can be as high as twenty dollars per ticket.34 The
plaintiffs contended that, by paying those fees, they suffered injury
to their property and have standing to sue under section 4 of the
Clayton Act.35
B. Majority Opinion
The court began by announcing the Supreme Court precedent
from Illinois Brick and its progeny that only “the ‘direct purchaser’
from a monopoly supplier could sue for treble damages under § 4 of
the Clayton Act.”36 The majority also included a collection of scholarly
interpretations defining the term “indirect purchaser.”37 However,
the court then concocted its own indirect purchaser recipe by saying
that “[a]n indirect purchaser is one who bears some portion of a monopoly overcharge only by virtue of an antecedent transaction between the monopolist and another, independent purchaser.”38
The Eighth Circuit proceeded to a necessary discussion of the economic assumptions underlying the indirect purchaser rule.39 In hashing out the rule, the court assumed that the direct purchaser is a
firm that has little choice but to buy its inputs from a monopoly at a
monopoly price and “[t]he indirect purchaser, in turn, pays some por33. Id.
34. Id. Consequently, since the Eighth Circuit opinion, and even more so since the initial filing of the Campos complaint in 1994, sales and distribution through Ticketmaster’s
online service, www.Ticketmaster.com, have become the most prolific way for Ticketmaster
to distribute tickets to concertgoers for events at large-scale venues. Anderson, supra note
18. Ticketmaster has capitalized on this new convenient method of distributing tickets.
Face value ticket prices can soar into the multi-hundreds of dollars for events such as
Woodstock ‘99 and the Rolling Stones. The Consumers’ Association of Ireland is preparing
a report on ticket prices which identifies an average convenience charge per ticket of 12.5%
of the face value price for tickets sold through Ticketmaster’s distribution services, allowing Ticketmaster to collect service charges equaling as much as thirty-five dollars per
ticket. Ticket Prices Are ‘a rip off’, STAGE, Apr. 10, 2003, at 7.
35. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Gregory J. Werden & Marius Schwartz, Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations—An Economic Analysis, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 629, 629 n.4 (1984)
(“The term ‘indirect purchaser’ . . . means any party that purchases a product from any
party in the vertical supply chain other than the party suspected of the antitrust violation
. . . .”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1717, 1717 (1990) (defining indirect purchasers are “those who bought an illegally
monopolized . . . product or service through the agency of a dealer, distributor, or some
other independent reseller who was not a participant in the antitrust violation”).
38. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169.
39. Id. at 1170.
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tion of the monopoly overcharge only because the previous [direct]
purchaser was unable to avoid that overcharge” and had to pass it on
to the indirect purchaser.40 The court admitted that the monopoly
overcharge usually “injures both those who deal directly and those
who deal derivatively with the monopolist.”41 The majority identified
this phenomenon as “incidence analysis,” or the “famously difficult”
determination of “[p]recisely what part of the overcharge will be
borne by the direct purchaser, and what [portion of the overcharge]
will be borne by the indirect purchaser.”42 The court noted that the
difficulty in apportioning damages between the direct and indirect
purchaser may lead to duplicative recovery if both are granted standing to sue for treble damages, and it cited this reasoning as a justification for denying standing to indirect purchasers under section 4 of
the Clayton Act.43 Before reaching the merits of the case, the court
opined that none of the exceptions to the indirect purchaser rule existed in this case.44 More specifically, there was no “cost-plus” contract, no allegation of the indirect purchasers owning or controlling
the direct purchaser, nor any “proper allegation that the direct purchasers have conspired with . . . Ticketmaster to commit antitrust
violation[s].”45
The majority responded to the plaintiffs’ assertion that because
they paid fees directly to Ticketmaster they were direct purchasers of
ticket distribution services with three specific rebuttals. First, the
Eighth Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit by finding that Ticketmaster’s service was more akin to a billing practice and, therefore,
not determinative of indirect purchaser status.46 Secondly, “[t]he
plaintiffs’ inability to obtain ticket [distribution] in a competitive
market is simply the consequence of the antecedent inability of venues to do so” by virtue of “Ticketmaster’s exclusive contracts with
almost every promoter of concerts in the United States.”47 The majority concluded that this kind of “derivative dealing is the essence of
indirect purchaser status,” and in turn, constituted a bar to plaintiffs’
suit for damages under the antitrust laws.48
Third, in response to the plaintiffs’ assertion that Ticketmaster’s
monopoly power is benign with respect to the venues because the
service fees are collected directly from buyers and are not part of the
“full” ticket price, the court adopted the notion that the actual “face
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1171.
Id.
Id. (citing McCarthy v. Recordex Service, Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 853 n.18 (1996)).
Campos, 140 F.3d at 1171.
Id.
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value” of the ticket and the cost of service fees “amount[ed] to the
single cost of attending the concert, regardless of how that cost is divided.”49 The majority finally concluded that because this aggregate
price of the ticket is “obviously a price [the concert-going] market will
bear, a venue free from Ticketmaster’s domination of ticket distribution would be able to charge that price itself” while having the ability
to keep the supracompetitive fees.50 The court affirmed the district
court’s holding that the plaintiffs were, in fact, indirect purchasers of
Ticketmaster’s services and therefore denied standing to sue for
treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.51
However, the majority held that, under Illinois Brick, section 16 of
the Clayton Act did not preclude the plaintiffs from seeking injunctive relief.52 Because the complexities of incidence analysis do not
arise when the courts consider the merits of injunctive relief, and because the plaintiffs claimed to have purchased tickets from and paid
the monopoly overcharge to Ticketmaster, the court held that the
plaintiffs did have standing to sue for injunctive relief.53
C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Arnold disagreed with the majority’s classification of the
plaintiffs in this case as indirect purchasers.54 He noted that the term
“antecedent transaction” appears nowhere in the cited authority nor
does the mere existence of an “antecedent transaction” convert all
purchasers of a monopolized good or service into indirect purchasers
under Illinois Brick.55 Judge Arnold embraced a two-prong analysis
for determining whether a party is an indirect purchaser under Illinois Brick.56
Illinois Brick requires that the antecedent transaction, first,
“must have been one in a direct vertical chain of transactions” and,
second, “must have resulted in the ‘passing on’ of [a portion of the]
monopoly [overcharge] from the direct purchaser to the indirect purchaser.”57 Judge Arnold concluded that no direct vertical chain of
transactions existed because “[t]he monopoly product at issue in this

49. Id. at 1171-72 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 495 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
50. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1172 (citing Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, 497 U.S. 199, 209
(1990); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492 (1968); United
States Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1357-58 n.19 (2d Cir.
1988)).
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1174-75 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1174.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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case [was] ticket distribution services, not tickets.”58 The antecedent
agreement between the venues and Ticketmaster was not one in
which the venues bought something from Ticketmaster for the purpose of reselling it to willing concertgoers.59 Rather, Ticketmaster
sold its services directly to the plaintiffs and it is irrelevant that
Ticketmaster “would not be supplying the service but for its antecedent agreement with the venues.”60
Judge Arnold concluded that the majority result unfortunately
made it unlikely for this or any plaintiff to have the ability to ever
bring a suit against Ticketmaster in the Eighth Circuit under section
4 of the Clayton Act.61
III. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISION
In section 4 of the Clayton Act, Congress has provided the ability
to sue for the remedy of treble damages to any person “injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws” and the ability to “recover threefold the damages” sustained by
him.62 The Court in Illinois Brick identified a dual purpose for Congress providing this right of action: (1) “deterring [antitrust] violators
and depriving them of the ‘fruits of their illegality,’” and (2) compensating “victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.”63
Despite this apparently inclusive Congressional grant of access to
the courts for victims of antitrust injury, the Court has not heeded its
own caution against creating restrictive burdens on this access.64 Instead, the Court has constructed the indirect purchaser doctrine to
bar certain plaintiffs standing to sue on antitrust claims. To best understand the concept of offensive passing-on and the restrictive indirect purchaser rule in Illinois Brick, we must begin with the idea of
defensive passing-on in its predecessor, Hanover Shoe.
A. The Passing-on Defense in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.
Hanover Shoe, a manufacturer of shoes, brought an action under
section 4 of the Clayton Act alleging that United Shoe Machinery
Corp.’s (“United”) “practice of leasing and refusing to sell its more
complicated and important shoe machinery” forced Hanover to lease
this machinery at an inflated price, which constituted unlawful mo58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1175.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
63. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
64. Id. at 755-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957)).
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nopolization in violation of the antitrust laws.65 Hanover prayed for
the recovery of “the difference between what it paid United in shoe
machine rentals and what it would have paid” had United, instead,
sold those same machines at a noninflated price.66
United argued, in its defense, that (1) Hanover would have
charged less and made the same level of profit had it bought, instead
of leased, the machinery from United, and (2) Hanover “suffered no
legally cognizable injury [because] the illegal overcharge . . . was reflected in the price charged for shoes sold by Hanover to its customers.”67 In other words, United argued that because the whole of this
illegal overcharge was reflected in the price Hanover charged customers for its shoes, they “passed-on” not only that charge, but also
the injury caused by that charge to those customers. If the Court accepted this argument, it would essentially relieve United of any liability to Hanover because Hanover’s customers, not Hanover itself,
would have been the appropriate plaintiffs.
Yet, the Supreme Court rejected United’s assertion of a passingon defense, holding that “when a buyer shows that the price paid by
him . . . is illegally high and also shows the amount of the overcharge, he has made out a prima facie case of injury and damage
within the meaning of [section 4 of the Clayton Act].”68 The Court
opined that the injury to Hanover occurred at the moment when it
leased the machinery at an illegally high price and that Hanover was
“equally entitled to damages if [it] raised the price for [its] own product.”69
The Court laid out three reasons for its decision to reject a passing-on defense. First, the Court identified the nearly insuperable difficulty of showing that Hanover could have the ability to, or even
would, raise its prices absent the overcharge.70 Second, if this defense
were available, it is doubtful that defendants would hesitate to proffer it, which would create “additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories.”71 Lastly,
the Supreme Court was concerned that the passing-on defense would
reduce the effectiveness of treble damage actions due to the need to
prove that the overcharge was passed onto individual customers. In
this case, individual customers consisted of buyers of individual pairs
of shoes with little interest or incentive to involve themselves in the
suit.72
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 483 (1968).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id. at 494.
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While this decision solves the question of whether a passing-on
defense may be used, the Court left unanswered the difficult question
of whether the concept of “passing-on” can be used offensively by indirect purchasers to prove injury and damages under the antitrust
laws. The Court met this question head-on in Illinois Brick.73
B. Offensive Passing-on and the Indirect Purchaser Rule in
Illinois Brick
When the Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois74 in
1977, it confronted the “mirror image”75 of Hanover Shoe. The respondent, the State of Illinois, initially brought this suit on behalf of
state and local government agencies against the petitioner, Illinois
Brick, under section 4 of the Clayton Act.76 Illinois argued that the
petitioner had conspired to fix the prices of concrete blocks, contrary
to the antitrust laws.77 These state and local government entities did
not directly purchase the concrete blocks from the petitioner.78 Instead, the concrete block was primarily sold to masonry subcontractors who then submitted bids to general contractors, who, in turn,
vied for government works contracts from the respondents.79 Although the state and local governments were indirect purchasers of
the monopolized concrete block, they contended that the whole or
part of the monopoly overcharge taken on by the subcontractor purchasing the concrete block from the petitioner was passed on to them
via the general contractor.80 By virtue of absorbing all or part of this
overcharge, the state and local government entities claimed that they
sustained antitrust injury, giving them standing to sue under section
4 of the Clayton Act.81 Illinois Brick rebutted that the respondents
lacked standing to sue under Hanover Shoe because they were indirect purchasers.82
Regarding the concern of applying the concept of “passing-on”
equally to both plaintiffs and defendants, the Court had a choice:
overrule Hanover Shoe to allow offensive and defensive passing-on or
apply Hanover Shoe to bar attempts to use the passing-on theory offensively.83 The Court took the latter approach, choosing to uphold
the construction of section 4 that it announced in Hanover Shoe—the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

431 U.S. at 726.
Id. at 722.
Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 603.
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
Id. at 726-27.
Id. at 726.
Id.
See id. at 727.
Id. at 726-27.
Id.
Id. at 729.
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“overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party ‘injured in his business or property.’“84
The Supreme Court cited a twofold rationale for choosing to congruently bar defensive and offensive passing-on theories. First, the
majority concluded that allowing the offensive but not the defensive
use of the passing-on theory would create the risk of inconsistent adjudications and duplicative liability for defendants.85 The Court
opined that in addition to the direct purchaser automatically recovering the full amount of the overcharge, the indirect purchaser(s)
would also sue to recover the amount of the overcharge they absorbed.86 If the majority were to accept this one-sided application of
Hanover Shoe, it would be validating the presumption that the direct
purchaser is entitled to a full recovery, “while preventing the defendant from using that [same] presumption against the other plaintiff[s]” to bar their recovery.87
The second rationale for announcing this indirect purchaser doctrine barring the use of offensive passing-on theory was the same rationale central to the Court’s holding in Hanover Shoe.88 The Court
denied the passing-on defense in Hanover Shoe because of the difficulty in clearing the evidentiary hurdle in proving that the whole of
the monopoly overcharge was passed-on to a subsequent purchaser.89
The majority in Illinois Brick reasoned that this hurdle would be
substantially exacerbated by the need for each subsequent purchaser-plaintiff in the chain of distribution to demonstrate that he or
she bore the whole or a portion of the overcharge to prove injury.90
Although the Court recognized the statutory purpose of section
4—to compensate injured plaintiffs—in upholding Hanover Shoe, the
Court validated the designation of the direct purchaser as the appropriate plaintiff to have standing to sue for antitrust injuries by virtue
of a monopoly overcharge.91

84. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
85. Id. at 730.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 730-31.
88. Compare Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493
(1968), with Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 732 (stating in both instances a concern for preventing long and complicated evidentiary proceedings giving parties the heavy burden of demonstrating the passing-on and extent of the overcharge through the chain of distribution to
prove injury to subsequent, indirect purchasers).
89. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493.
90. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 732.
91. Id. at 734-35.
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IV. INCONSISTENCY AND THE EVISCERATION OF THE ILLINOIS BRICK
INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE
Despite the apparent clarity in the Court’s annunciation of the indirect purchaser rule, subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court
and lower courts seem to have clouded this clear view of antitrust injury and standing. The Supreme Court not only went on to create a
comprehensive methodology for antitrust standing,92 but the Court
approved, under state antitrust laws, the same indirect purchaser
actions that it had per se barred in the federal context.93 Lower
courts have interpreted the Illinois Brick indirect purchaser doctrine
inconsistently since that decision.
A. The Supreme Court Clouding the View
1. Antitrust Standing in Associated General Contractors of
California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters
In AGC, the Court created a two-part test to determine whether a
plaintiff shall have standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered an
injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent, and
for which they provide a remedy.94 Second, the Court proffered three
factors for courts to consider. These include the remoteness of the injury,95 the availability of a plaintiff with greater self-interest to bring
an action against the monopoly firm,96 and the difficulty of the litigation in determining damages if an alternate plaintiff shall be permitted to bring an action.97
Although this analysis is described as being “analytically distinct”98 from that of Illinois Brick, many of the same concerns that
exist in Illinois Brick are embodied in AGC. Both are concerned with
not burdening courts with the complicated task of apportioning damages.99 Some scholars have wondered, in light of the closeness of the
two opinions, whether Illinois Brick would have been decided in the
same manner if the Court had the luxury of having its antitrust

92. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 540-43 (1983).
93. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
94. AGC, 459 U.S. at 540; see also Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482
(1982) (“The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.”).
95. AGC, 459 U.S. at 540.
96. Id. at 542.
97. Id. at 543-44.
98. McCready, 457 U.S. at 476.
99. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 544; Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977).
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standing guidelines from AGC as the backdrop.100 If this reversal of
chronology actually took place, the Court may have decided Illinois
Brick under the antitrust standing rubric set out in AGC, dispensing
with the action based on the “remoteness of indirect purchasers, the
complexity of the damage calculation, and the presence of potential
plaintiffs . . . who would be motivated to bring an action.”101 Yet, the
reality is that the Court failed to subsume Illinois Brick into the antitrust standing analysis, which leaves questions concerning how to
correctly interpret Illinois Brick in light of AGC.
One possible interpretation is that if a plaintiff is identified as an
indirect purchaser, courts can disregard the case-by-case analysis set
out in AGC because, by their nature, indirect purchasers will rarely
meet this standing test. This interpretation characterizes the way
the indirect purchaser doctrine is presently applied.102 However, a
second, albeit less stringent, interpretation may be that not every indirect purchaser would automatically be barred from bringing an action for violation of the antitrust laws.103 A discussion later in this
Comment will address the dichotomy between these two interpretations and the preference for the second interpretation when courts
are charged with deciding cases such as Campos.104
2. California v. ARC America Corp.
In addition to creating a test for courts to determine whether to
grant antitrust standing to plaintiffs, the Supreme Court’s decision
in California v. ARC America Corp. (ARC)105 has had a destabilizing
effect on antitrust deterrence and enforcement. ARC involved state
government plaintiffs who were indirect purchasers of cement—in
much the same way as the plaintiffs in Illinois Brick were indirect
purchasers of brick—bringing a treble damages action not only under
section 4 of the Clayton Act but also under similar state antitrust
laws that granted recovery to direct and indirect purchasers alike.106
This decision turned on whether the interpretation of section 4 of the
Clayton Act found in Illinois Brick preempted state antitrust laws,

100. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in
Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1999).
101. Id. Consequently, the indirect purchasers in Illinois Brick would most likely have
met the antitrust injury component of the AGC test because the part of the monopoly overcharge that was passed on to them is the type of injury that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 17-19.
104. See infra Part V.
105. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
106. Id. at 97-98.
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regardless of explicit state statutory provisions allowing indirect purchasers to recover in a treble damages cause of action of this kind.107
The Court identified a path to follow in order to determine
whether federal law preempts state law. Without an express statement by Congress of preemption, courts can find that state law is
preempted “when Congress intends that federal law occupy a given
field,” or, if Congress has not occupied the field, when “the state law
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”108 The Court, unconvincingly,109 concluded that allowing recovery for indirect purchasers under state antitrust laws would not conflict with the policies expressed
in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. The Court held that nowhere in
any of the Court’s prior cases construing section 4 of the Clayton Act
did a majority “identify a federal policy against States imposing liability in addition to that imposed by federal law.”110
It is hard to imagine an overarching policy more clear than the
policy announced in Illinois Brick: allowing offensive passing-on
without the availability of defensive passing-on would lead to inconsistent adjudications, duplicity in recoveries, and unnecessary multiplicity in defendants’ liability.111 The Court persists in constructing
an unnecessarily high wall which completely separates federal and
state antitrust actions, each having no contingent effect on the other.
Yet, in viewing state and federal antitrust actions from the standpoint of potential defendants, it is simple to realize that allowing indirect purchasers to recover damages under state antitrust laws directly conflicts with the federal policy of preventing multiple liability
underlying the indirect purchaser doctrine. Potential defendants do
not construct this same barrier, and they perceive potential liability
and the possibility of duplicative recoveries from state and federal
damages actions in the aggregate. While unpersuasively explaining
away the obvious contradiction between its ARC opinion and past
federal indirect purchaser cases, the Court, in allowing state lawsanctioned indirect purchaser actions, has effectively lessened, if not
totally eliminated, a firm’s ability to “determine the expected cost of
taking any action that falls in the gray areas of antitrust.”112

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 100-01 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
See Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 12-13.
ARC, 490 U.S. at 105.
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977).
See Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 13.
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B. An Array of Inconsistent Lower Federal Court Interpretations of
the Indirect Purchaser Rule
Adding to the contradictions surrounding the use of the indirect
purchaser doctrine in Supreme Court decisions, the lower federal
courts have levied inconsistent interpretations of Illinois Brick and of
how the antitrust standing guidelines should be applied in relation to
Illinois Brick. The following opinions demonstrate the confusion over
the Supreme Court’s decisions in this area and reveal the need for an
announcement from the High Court of a method to consistently decide cases in this area.
1. In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation
In the case of In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation,113 the Third Circuit was confronted with a suit by manufacturers of steel against railroad companies for halting the use of newly
developed, less expensive means of transporting iron ore.114 Because
the railroad controlled the off-loading technology, the railroad was allegedly able to boycott nonrailroad-owned docks by not making its
transportation technology compatible with the newer, and less expensive, off-loading equipment.115 In addition, the railroad continued
to charge the steel producers the more expensive rate for use of the
older off-loading equipment.116 Although the manufacturers of the
newer, less expensive off-loading equipment were the entities most
directly affected by the railroad’s action, the plaintiff steel producers
complained of damages stemming from the supracompetitive price
they paid to the railroad, less the price that would have been paid by
the steel manufacturers had the railroad allowed the newly developed technology to be used in off-loading iron ore.117
The Third Circuit, under AGC, granted standing to the plaintiff
steel purchasers in this action.118 While recognizing that, “in some
sense, [the steel producers were] ‘indirect’ purchasers,” the Third
Circuit refused to simply bar recovery based on this point alone and
noted that AGC instructed them to inquire into the remoteness of the
injury and the “nature of the relationship between the parties.”119
While the railroad’s anticompetitive actions caused injury to the
component industries, the court concentrated on the brunt of the direct injury borne by the steel producers: the increased costs stemming from the railroad inhibiting the development of cheaper tech113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1152-53.
Id.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1168.
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nology.120 The steel companies were the only customers of the iron
ore shipping industry, and the court recognized that, “indeed, th[at]
industry existed [exclusively] for them.”121
More importantly, the Third Circuit analyzed, under the guidelines in AGC, the possibility of duplicative recovery and the difficult
issues involving apportionment of damages.122 The type of duplicative
recovery that Illinois Brick wished to prevent—parties all along the
chain of distribution competing for the same limited amount of profits earned by the price-fixer from antitrust violations—was not present here.123 This is because the steel producers’ damages claim is
characteristic of a typical monopoly overcharge, and the component
industries are claiming lost profits.124 The court made the distinct
point that the existence of complexities in apportioning damages
should not allow the court to avoid the litigation.125 This makes good
sense because standing is an initial determination in which the court
inquires into whether the plaintiffs “have alleged a cause of action
and have requested the recovery of damages that are cognizable under the law.”126 The Third Circuit brings some rationality to this discussion by noting that injured parties should not be further penalized and left without any redress simply because the trial court assumes that, in every instance of an action brought by an indirect
purchaser, the ascertainment of damages will be a burden too great
for the court to carry.127
2. In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litigation
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Brand Name Prescription
Drug Antitrust Litigation (Brand Name),128 written by Chief Judge
Posner, also left the window open for private treble damages actions
by indirect purchasers.129 In this case, retail pharmacies brought an
action against wholesalers and manufacturers of prescription drugs,
claiming that the defendants conspired with each other to effectively
boycott certain retailers by denying them discounts on brand-name
prescription drugs that were given to other preferred customers, including HMOs and mail order pharmacies.130 Although the court held
that the plaintiffs were quintessential indirect purchasers that were
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1169-70.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 604-07.
Id. at 602-04.
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barred from recovery of monopoly overcharges in an antitrust action,
the court also determined that there was enough evidence of the existence of an alleged conspiracy for the plaintiffs to survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.131
However, in the event the defendant wholesalers and manufacturers did not take part in a price-fixing conspiracy, Chief Judge
Posner reasoned:
We can imagine the present case reconfigured in a way that might
take it out of the orbit of [Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick]; it
would not be a matter of carving a further exception. A number of
pharmacies have tried to improve their bargaining position vis-àvis the drug manufacturers by forming buying groups. . . . The
manufacturers have been steadfast in refusing to grant discounts
to such groups. If this refusal, taking as it does the form of a refusal to enter into direct contractual relations with certain retailers, such as the manufacturers have with their favored customers,
were successfully challenged as a boycott, the Illinois Brick rule,
which is a rule concerning overcharges, would fall away. The
plaintiffs would be permitted to prove up whatever damages they
could show had flowed from the boycott, provided they weren’t
seeking to recover overcharges, for that would entail the very incidence analysis that Illinois Brick bars.132

This scenario suggests the problem with Illinois Brick. If the
plaintiffs are not deemed by a court to be indirect purchasers, then
this alleviates the need to rely on a boycott theory. Yet, reliance by
plaintiffs on a boycott theory would become a requirement if they
were determined to be indirect purchasers.133 Reliance on a boycott
theory would necessitate a demonstration not of an overcharge but,
rather, the lost profits that resulted from the existence of the boycott.134 However, in determining the lost profits, the court would be
charged with the task of identifying exactly what the discount, in
this scenario, would have been had the plaintiffs not been disfavored
by the manufacturers and wholesalers.135 This calculation is the same
as the basic overcharge analysis—identifying the price the indirect
purchaser would have been charged had the supracompetitive overcharge not existed and not been passed on to them—which the Court
supposedly prohibited in Illinois Brick.136

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 606, 616.
Id. at 606 (internal citations omitted).
Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 (1977).
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3. Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc.
Unlike Chief Judge Posner’s concentration on the substantive violation in Brand Name, Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. (Lucas)137 represents an expansion of the per se
application of Illinois Brick without respect to the substantive violation claimed by the plaintiff.138 Here the plaintiff, a distributor of vintage automobile tires, filed an action to recover treble damages
against its competitor for acquiring an exclusive right to manufacture and distribute Firestone vintage tires.139 The court initially determined that, as a competitor, the plaintiff lacked the requisite antitrust injury and therefore lacked standing to sue for treble damages
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.140
Alternatively, the plaintiffs alleged that they had standing since
they were forced to purchase some of their stock of vintage tires from
the defendant competing distributor as a result of this exclusive contract.141 Noting that the plaintiffs had yet to actually purchase any
tires from the defendants and were purchasing products directly
from the primary supplier, who in turn used the defendant as a distributor, the court held that the plaintiffs were indirect purchasers.142
While the Supreme Court of the United States had yet to apply the
indirect purchaser rule to a claim of this type,143 the Ninth Circuit
expanded the indirect purchaser doctrine from applying only to pricefixing cases to applying it to most actions under section 4 of the Clayton Act.144
4. Sports Racing Services, Inc. v. Sports Car Club of America,
Inc.
The defendants in Sports Racing Services, Inc. v. Sports Car Club
of America, Inc. (Sports Racing)145 were the organizers of amateur
sports car racing events in which the plaintiff participated.146 As organizer of these events, the defendants required all participants to
137. 140 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998).
138. Id. at 1233-34.
139. Id. at 1230-32.
140. Id. at 1233.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1233-34.
143. The case law applying the indirect purchaser rule under section 4 of the Clayton
Act had been limited to cases involving sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act while this
opinion suggested the expansion of the doctrine to include those cases involving section 7 of
the Clayton Act. Id.
144. Id.
145. 131 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1997).
146. Id. at 878. This Comment solely looks at how the court viewed plaintiff John
Freeman; it does not discuss the Court’s viewpoint of Freeman’s business, plaintiff Sports
Racing Services, Inc. (SRS).
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purchase and use specific parts that, conveniently, the defendants
exclusively sold via an independent distributor.147 Plaintiff, therefore,
did not purchase these automobile parts directly from the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants monopolized the particular market for sports racing cars and parts, and that the defendants illegally tied the plaintiff’s ability to race in these events to the
purchase of specified race cars and parts.148
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis is strikingly similar to Judge Posner’s opinion in Brand Name. The majority noted that “standing
analysis must take into account the type of antitrust claim being asserted”149 in holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his
monopolization claim because he was an indirect purchaser of sports
racing cars and parts.150 However, at the same time, the majority
concluded that the plaintiff was not barred from asserting his tying
claim because the plaintiff was a “direct purchaser of the tying product and he was forced to purchase the tied product” from the distributor dictated by the defendants.151 The court identified the tying
product as “racing services” and the tied product as the cars and
parts that the defendants specified for entrance into the races.152
The oddity of this holding is that the market at issue in the monopolization claim—the purchase of specified sports racing cars and
parts—is precisely the same as the tied product market in the tying
claim. Yet, the court barred the plaintiff from going forward with the
former claim and allowed standing for the latter, although both
claims were aimed at redressing the defendants’ anticompetitive actions in the market for cars and parts. This method of analysis is
much like that of Judge Posner’s in Brand Name, in that the court
relied exclusively on the label of the claim in determining its treatment, even though the defendants’ actual actions were not different.153
Although the court characterized the plaintiff as an indirect purchaser under the monopolization claim, the court recognized the
“first ‘innocent’ purchaser” notion that stems from Illinois Brick and
applied it to the tying claim.154 In Sports Racing, the direct purchaser
of the tied item was merely a pawn for the defendants, and the de147. Id.
148. Id. at 878-79.
149. Id. at 882.
150. Id. at 882-84.
151. Id. at 886-87.
152. Id.
153. Chief Judge Posner concentrated on the idea that changing the label of the violation could allow an indirect purchaser to gain standing as long as this plaintiff did not base
their damages claim on a theory of monopoly overcharge. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1997). However, the two opinions diverge because the Sports Racing court did not discuss damage calculations.
154. Sports Racing, 131 F.3d at 889.
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fendants should not be able to avoid enforcement by designating an
independent distributor to sell the tied product to the plaintiff.155
Therefore, the court took the common-sense approach by granting
standing to the indirect purchaser and appointing it as the “best”
party to pursue this claim.156
V. LOOKING AT CAMPOS THROUGH A NEW LENS
A. Are Purchasers of Concert Tickets Through Ticketmaster’s Ticket
Distribution Service Really Indirect Purchasers?
In addition to Judge Arnold’s dissent in Campos,157 scholars have
devoted a fair amount of academic discussion to the notion that the
plaintiffs in Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp. were not in fact indirect
purchasers.158 The Eighth Circuit in Campos proposed that “[a]n indirect purchaser is one who bears some portion of a monopoly overcharge only by virtue of an antecedent transaction between the monopolist and another, independent purchaser.”159 The exclusive contracts between the venues and Ticketmaster were the antecedent
transactions that rendered the plaintiffs in Campos indirect purchasers because the exclusive contracts identified from whom the
plaintiffs would purchase tickets.160 The majority reasoned that the
ticket price and the service charge were two segments that combined
to equal the overall price of admission to a concert.161 The court assumed that this price was at a profit-maximizing level which the
market could bear and that if Ticketmaster, or a similar distributor,
was not involved in this arrangement, the venue would charge concertgoers the same price.162 This allowed the Campos majority to view
the venues as incurring the service charge themselves by permitting
Ticketmaster to distribute tickets to events at these venues.
The Eighth Circuit’s misapplication of Illinois Brick stems from
the court’s inability to properly identify the monopoly product; in this
case, ticket distribution services. An example taken from your everyday barber shop best illustrates this misapplication.163

155. Id. at 887.
156. Id. This argument by the court is more akin to the examination of the merits of
potential plaintiffs that is found in AGC.
157. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 (8th Cir. 1998) (Arnold, J.,
dissenting).
158. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the
Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 447 (2001); Blair &
Harrison, supra note 100, at 21-23.
159. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169.
160. Id. at 1171.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1172.
163. The following example is adapted from Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 488-89.
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When a person wants a “crew cut,”164 she can either go to the local
barber shop and employ the services of the barber to cut her hair
with clippers, or she can purchase a set of clippers directly from the
manufacturer and perform the haircut herself. If the woman chooses
to have her hair cut at the barber shop, she would be the direct purchaser of the barber’s hair-cutting services and the indirect purchaser of the clippers that the barber uses to give the haircut. On the
other hand, if the woman chooses to cut her own hair, she would be a
direct purchaser of the clippers and would not even enter the market
for the barber’s hair-cutting services.165
Suppose the clipper manufacturer is the monopolist and the clippers are the monopoly product. If the woman chooses to have her
hair cut by the barber, she will be an indirect purchaser of the monopoly product and will, in turn, bear the portion of the monopoly
overcharge which the barber passes on to her. Thus, because of difficulties in apportioning damages and the avoidance of multiple liability, a court would anoint the barber the direct purchaser of the monopoly product. Moreover, the barber would be the appropriate plaintiff to bring suit against the monopoly manufacturer under Illinois
Brick.166 However, if the woman decides to purchase the monopoly
product and cut her hair herself, then she obviously is the direct purchaser of the clippers and, furthermore, would be granted standing to
sue the monopolist manufacturer under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.167
Change the scenario. If the monopolist is the barber who is the
only barber in town and the monopoly product is the hair-cutting
services, then it is difficult to see how the woman could ever be an
indirect purchaser of the monopoly product. If the woman employs
the services of the barber to cut her hair, then she is a direct purchaser of the barber’s hair-cutting services and she “would clearly be
a direct purchaser of the monopoly product.”168 The woman can avoid
paying the monopoly overcharge “by never entering the market for
the monopoly product”169—purchasing the clippers and cutting her
own hair. Under this revised scenario, any antecedent agreement
that may exist between the manufacturer of the clippers and the
barber would not affect the woman’s purchaser status.

164. A crew cut is “a style of man’s or boy’s haircut in which the hair is cropped close to
the head, but left bristly on top to look like a brush.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 342 (4th ed. 2000). A woman is used in this scenario as an homage to a woman
who would love a “crew cut” but, according to WEBSTER’S definition, can never have one.
165. Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 488-89.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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This example magnifies the importance of courts correctly identifying the monopolist and the monopoly product. With this example in
mind, the court may have interpreted the plaintiffs in Campos more
accurately as direct purchasers if it would have simply construed the
monopoly product as ticket distribution services and, therefore, Ticketmaster as the monopolist.170
The example171 also illustrates the need for there to be a distinction between goods and services. In the barber shop example, the
clippers are a good which buyers can purchase and resell, making the
indirect purchaser doctrine an issue because of the concerns of difficulty in apportioning damages and duplicative liability arising out of
the possibility of subsequent purchasers. However, the barber’s haircutting services do not implicate the indirect purchaser doctrine because once the service is rendered, the hair is gone and it is swept
away. The value of the service cannot be resold and can only be realized by the direct purchaser.172 Therefore, when the monopoly product is a service, it is irrelevant whether the service provider uses
other goods, such as clippers or, in the case of Campos, tickets in the
rendering of that service.
B. Limiting Illinois Brick’s Indirect Purchaser Doctrine in Favor of a
Comprehensive Case-by-Case Analysis
The inquiry must not end here. Even assuming the Eighth Circuit
was correct in its interpretation of preceding case law—that the
plaintiffs in Campos were, in fact, indirect purchasers173—this decision raises many concerns about the availability of points of entry
into the judicial process for similarly situated plaintiffs and the wisdom of such a rigid rule. Despite the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court that it is an “unwarranted and counterproductive exercise to
litigate a series of exceptions” to the indirect purchaser rule, even
though the “economic assumptions underlying the Illinois Brick rule

170. The Eighth Circuit viewed Ticketmaster as the monopolist which sold its ticket
distribution services to the direct purchaser venues which, in turn, sold tickets to the indirect purchaser-plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs alleged monopoly overcharges arising out
of Ticketmaster’s services and not from the purchase of tickets. Campos v. Ticketmaster
Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 (8th Cir. 1998).
171. The barber shop example provides a better metaphor for the indirect purchaser
analysis than Kingsbury’s house-painting example. See Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 48889. Certainly, if a subsequent buyer of a painted house assumes a portion of the overcharge
that the previous owner incurred as a result of the previous owner’s purchase of the monopoly product (painting services), then the subsequent purchaser may be considered an
indirect purchaser of the painting services. Once one employs the services of a monopolist
barber, the hair is gone and the value of this service cannot be passed on to a subsequent
purchaser.
172. Id.
173. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1171.
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might be disproved in . . . specific case[s],”174 the Court has left much
to be desired in indirect purchaser jurisprudence by not granting certiorari on any of the inconsistent lower court decisions in this area.
This neglect, coupled with an announcement of general antitrust
standing in AGC and the allowance of indirect purchaser actions on
the state level, has rendered this line of jurisprudence in need of direction.
1. The Need for Flexibility in Any New Analysis
A new doctrine must not be rigid and should be flexible enough to
deal with most factual situations that confront it. A more prophylactic rule, akin to AGC, which courts can apply on a case-by-case basis
will allow courts to effectively weigh a number of factors in a pragmatic manner. Thus, this rule will allow plaintiffs to knock down the
per se barrier that has been placed in front of them in these antitrust
cases and bestow upon parties who are injured by monopolists a clear
point of entry into our judicial system.
2. Revised Factors for Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act
This Comment does not necessarily propose any new factors for
courts to consider on the issue of antitrust standing. However, in order for courts to apply the AGC criteria in a pragmatic fashion,
courts must view these criteria through a more practical and flexible
lens. AGC announced a two-pronged analysis for determining
whether a plaintiff has standing to press an antitrust claim. First,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered an injury
that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and redress.175 Second, the Court proffered three factors for courts to consider in determining whether to permit the indirect purchaser-plaintiff to bring an
action: the remoteness of the injury,176 the availability of a plaintiff
with greater self-interest to bring an action against the monopoly
firm,177 and the difficulty of determining damages and its effect on
the overall difficulty of the litigation.178
(a) Antitrust Injury
Courts deem antitrust plaintiffs who fail the first prong of the
AGC test to have not incurred the type of injury that the antitrust
174. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, 497 U.S. 199, 217 (1990).
175. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519 (1983); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
176. AGC, 459 U.S. at 540.
177. Id. at 542.
178. Id. at 543-44.
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laws protect. Yet, even if plaintiffs have suffered a sufficient antitrust injury and have satisfactorily met the factors within the second
prong of the AGC standing test, as indirect purchasers, courts bar
them from pressing this claim in price-fixing suits.179 However,
Brand Name has suggested that indirect purchasers who recharacterize their injury as stemming from some violation other than pricefixing would satisfy the antitrust injury prong of this test.180
This reconfiguring of a complaint to fit the substantive violation
into the appropriate pigeon hole is the height of form over substance.
Whether the plaintiff alleges price-fixing violations or, for example, a
group boycott, the injury and resulting damages are likely to be the
same. Indirect purchasers seem likely to satisfy the antitrust injury
prong of the AGC test because the monopoly overcharge, which eventually passes on to them, is the type of injury that the antitrust laws
were designed to prevent. To insure the requisite flexibility and
pragmatism in the application of AGC, Illinois Brick should not be
viewed as foreclosing the possibility of moving onto the second prong
of AGC. If the indirect purchaser-plaintiff can sufficiently plead an
antitrust injury, the court should evaluate the merits of granting an
antitrust plaintiff of this type standing under the second prong of
AGC.
(b) Remoteness of the Injury and the Availability of a Plaintiff with
Greater Self-Interest to Bring an Action Against the Monopoly
Firm
In addition, AGC requires courts to consider the directness or indirectness of the alleged injury and whether “an identifiable class of
persons [exists] whose self-interest would normally motivate them”
to pursue the claim against the monopolist in order to vindicate the
public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws.181 Under the current paradigm, however, it is insignificant that the indirect purchaser-plaintiffs have suffered the most direct injury and have the
greatest motivation, in light of the directness of that injury, to bring
the claim forward because a per se application of Illinois Brick denies
these plaintiffs the opportunity to do so.
Lower Lake Erie,182 with this concern at the core of its rationale,
suggests that the plaintiff with the greatest motivation to bring the
claim and with the most direct injury may have standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act even if the court identifies this plaintiff as

179.
180.
1997).
181.
182.

Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 17 n.147.
In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir.
AGC, 459 U.S. at 540, 542.
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993).
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an indirect purchaser.183 Moreover, taking into account the exception
to the indirect purchaser rule regarding a direct purchaser owned or
controlled by the firm fixing prices, which is sanctioned in Illinois
Brick,184 the Supreme Court itself has suggested that indirect purchasers “would have federal standing when the . . . direct purchaser
has little motivation to bring an action” to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement.185 Sports Racing echoes this suggestion
by rejecting an overly restrictive indirect purchaser doctrine.186 Such
a doctrine would not only favor a direct purchaser who is not the best
plaintiff to seek redress from the anticompetitive actions of the monopolist—regarding the direct purchaser’s motivation to bring suit—
but also would bar indirect purchasers at all costs, all at the expense
of “vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws.”187 Under this
pair of factors in the second prong of AGC, courts should give great
weight in their standing determinations to a demonstration that the
indirect purchaser-plaintiff is most directly injured by the antitrust
violation and that there is no other party, including the direct purchaser, who has a greater motivation to pursue this claim.
(c) The Difficulty of “Incidence Analysis” if Courts Permit an Indirect
Purchaser-Plaintiff to Bring an Action
Lastly, courts must determine whether, if the indirect purchaser
is granted standing to pursue its claim, judges and juries will be saddled with the “famously difficult” task of determining what price the
indirect purchaser would have been charged had the direct purchaser
not incurred the whole or part of the monopoly overcharge.188 Chief
Judge Posner in Brand Name applied the rigid dictates of Illinois
Brick by assuming that any indirect purchaser pleading an injury
from a monopoly overcharge will certainly charge the court with the
complex task of apportioning damages that accompany this incidence
analysis and which Illinois Brick expressly prohibited.189 Yet, Posner
alerted the public to a detour around the indirect purchaser doctrine
by not only suggesting that an antitrust plaintiff plead an alternate
183. Id. at 1168-69.
184. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 n.12 (1977).
185. Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 14. The ownership-and-control exception
permits the indirect purchaser to pursue her claim because the direct purchaser is not independent from the monopolist and, therefore, has little, if any, interest to pursue the
claim on behalf of the public interest in antitrust enforcement. Id. at 14 n.116.
186. Id.
187. Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 889 (10th
Cir. 1997).
188. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Contractors, 459 U.S.
519, 543-44 (1983); see also Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir.
1998).
189. In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir.
1997).
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substantive violation but also suggesting that this plaintiff may pray
for relief from injury that takes the form of lost profits instead of a
monopoly overcharge.190 This suggestion to plaintiffs would require
courts to take part in a similar, and sometimes difficult, damage calculation. If the same analysis is involved in either calculation, why
does the Seventh Circuit allow the court to take on this task to determine lost profits while, in the same breath, shunning the similar
task by denying standing to plaintiffs who ask the court to grant relief from monopoly overcharges?
The Third Circuit’s holding in Lower Lake Erie is equally as curious in regards to this question. The court refused to prohibit standing to indirect purchasers merely because of assumed complexities in
apportionment of damages.191 Reliability of damage theories should
not be determined at this stage of the litigation simply because they
are presented in a complex way.192 Rather, a court should only deny
standing when the initial allegation of damages appears “incapable
of accurate calculation.”193 According to Chief Judge Posner, calculation of lost profits and, in turn, the monopoly overcharge is not as
“famously difficult” as the Illinois Brick Court once thought.
3. Aligning Federal Indirect Purchaser Jurisprudence with ARC
It would be unrealistic to open the federal courts to indirect purchasers in the same manner that ARC approved state statutes that
did so.194 However, liberalization of the indirect purchaser doctrine
through the more pragmatic application of AGC described above195
would go a long way toward bringing state and federal courts in step
with each other. This alignment should facilitate a greater expectation on the part of defendants of the costs of their actions in the antitrust realm.
C. Applying a More Pragmatic AGC to Campos
Assuming that the plaintiff-concertgoers were indirect purchasers,
the factual background of Campos does not lend itself to the per se
application of Illinois Brick used by the Eighth Circuit. The plaintiffs
in Campos complained of being subjected to a monopoly overcharge
in the form of supracompetitive service fees.196 These overcharges
satisfy the antitrust injury prong of the AGC test because they con190.
191.
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Id.; Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 20.
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 U.S. 1144, 1169 (3d Cir.
Id.
Id.
See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989).
See supra Part V.B.2.
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stitute the type of injury that the antirust laws were designed to prevent.
The plaintiff class of concertgoers is the only party injured by
Ticketmaster’s anticompetitive activity. The supracompetitive service fees charged by Ticketmaster are directly borne, in full, by every
consumer who orders tickets for popular entertainment events by
waiting in line at a sanctioned Ticketmaster outlet in a local shopping mall, by logging onto Ticketmaster’s online ordering system
(which is often slow and frequently crashes), or by calling Ticketmaster’s charge-by-phone system and having the privilege of getting past
a busy signal.197 Even under the Eighth Circuit’s characterization of
concert venues as direct purchasers, these venues bear no resemblance to an injured direct purchaser who passes on the whole or
part of the monopoly overcharge down the chain of distribution.198
Rather, concert venues fit the mold of an unharmed bystander—the
venues, although labeled as direct purchasers by the Eighth Circuit,
do not seem to have sustained any sort of cognizable injury. Quite
the opposite result is present, and concert venues receive part of the
monopoly overcharge in exchange for granting to Ticketmaster the
exclusive right to distribute tickets for events which will take place
at these venues.199 Under this more realistic setting, the plaintiffindirect purchasers have sustained the most direct injury, and these
concertgoers can hardly depend on the concert venues to have the
necessary motivation to vindicate Ticketmaster’s antitrust violations
on their behalf.
Lastly, although the notion of incidence analysis may present difficulties for courts in apportioning damages, these complexities are
lacking under the factual background in Campos. Ticketmaster
passes on the whole of the monopoly overcharge to concertgoers.
Moreover, the court in Campos misconstrued the record by characterizing the monopoly overcharge and the price of the ticket as one fee
that the venue would charge in the absence of any exclusive contract
with Ticketmaster. The court was not required to determine what
price the indirect purchaser-plaintiffs would have been charged in
the absence of the supracompetitive convenience fee in order to accurately apportion damages to the plaintiffs in this suit. When tickets
are purchased directly from the box offices at popular entertainment

197. Ticketmaster offers these three ways to obtain tickets to most any entertainment
event. I speak, not sarcastically, from many personal frustrating experiences that accompany attempts at being lucky enough to get tickets to see my favorite band. While it is certainly a joyous moment when I am successful in this endeavor, being charged exorbitant
convenience fees for something that is hardly convenient makes this moment bittersweet.
198. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1174 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
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venues, convenience charges are not levied on concertgoers.200 Therefore, courts would not be confronted with the same complex apportionment calculations that accompany factual situations consisting of
a direct purchaser only passing on part of the monopoly overcharge
to indirect purchasers. Viewed in this way, the plaintiffs in Campos
fall short of those in Illinois Brick and other indirect purchaser cases
of this type.
VI. CONCLUSION
The outcome in Campos certainly seems less logical when viewed
through the more pragmatic lens of AGC proposed in this Comment.
AGC embodies the notion that not all indirect purchasers are created
equal. A pragmatic application of its two-pronged analysis, coupled
with a relaxation of the strictures of Illinois Brick, will make this notion a reality. It will open the doors of the federal courthouse to
plaintiffs who resemble, in their antitrust injuries, favored plaintiffs
under the current paradigm, but who are denied standing, even after
favorably meeting the criteria in AGC, solely based on an across-theboard application of an arbitrary label. This logical shift in doctrine
is absolutely necessary if the American legal system wishes to take
seriously the task of facilitating vigorous private enforcement of the
antitrust laws.

200. Most venues do not charge any fees in excess of the face value ticket price for
ticket purchases directly from the venue box office. While venues are not precluded from
charging this excessive monopolistic fee, those that do, do not do so in such an excessive
dollar amount as does Ticketmaster.

